



During the global financial crisis, the financial
sector has gone through a dramatic re-appraisal
of liquidity risk. As a result of a continued drop
in the market value of mortgage-backed
securities from the subprime segment of the US
market and the announcement of problems of
some European banks, the interbank market
came under extreme strain. This confidence
crisis had the following consequences: (i) Amidst
increased market nervousness, interbank
interest rates sharply rose. (ii) Many segments
of the structured credit and mortgage market
ceased to trade at all, making it difficult to price
outstanding positions. (iii) Investors sometimes
failed to raise enough cash through asset
sales. (iv) Interbank lending became scarce in
a context of liquidity hoarding [17]. In response
to the freezing up of the interbank market, the
European Central Bank and U.S. Federal
Reserve injected billions in overnight credit into
the interbank market. However, some banks
needed extra liquidity supports [12], [28]. Even
with extensive support, a number of banks
failed, were forced into mergers or required
resolution [8].
Liquidity problems could be seen also in the
Hungarian and Polish banking sector. Three
Hungarian banks (OTP Bank, FHB Mortgage
Bank and MFB – Magyar Fejlesztési Bank)
were provided with a loan from the government
in March 2009. The loans were provided at
market interest rates for three and a half years
from the credit line that Hungary received from
the International Monetary Fund and the
European Union. The primary goal was to
ensure the liquidity of banks that have no foreign
parent bank. The banks made a commitment
that they would use the funds for lending to retail
and small and medium-sized entrepreneurs in
Hungary. Besides, FHB Mortgage Bank was
granted a HUF 30 billion equity raise [20]. In the
Polish banking sector, the situation was not so
dramatic. However, the deterioration in the
macroeconomic situation weakened the
functioning of the interbank market, increased
the cost of money on the market and deepened
the gap between deposits and loans [30].
It is evident that bank liquidity and liquidity
risk is a very up-to-date and an important topic
which should be of crucial importance for
academics and policymakers. The aim of this
paper is therefore to describe the development
of liquid assets ratios and to find out
determinants which affect their values in the
Visegrad countries.
The financial system in the Visegrad
countries is traditionally based on banks and
credit markets. The Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and Slovak Republic are a part of an
economically integrated area. Although all
Visegrad countries are characterized by
a universal banking model, activities of banks in
the financial markets significantly differ. Various
studies investigated various aspects of the
functioning of stock markets [36], exchange
rates [35], bank concentration, competition and
efficiency [34] and financial integration in the
Visegrad countries [23], [40]. However, the
empirical evidence of determinants of bank
liquidity in these countries is still missing (the
only complex study of determinants of bank
liquidity in these countries uses data only for
the period 1994–2004 [16]). The contribution of
this paper is therefore obvious.
The paper is structured as follows. The next
section defines bank liquidity and characterizes
methods of its measuring. Section 2 describes
trends in liquid assets in the Visegrad
countries. Following sections focus on the
model and show results of a regression
analysis. The last section captures concluding
remarks.
LIQUID ASSETS IN BANKING: WHAT
MATTERS IN THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES?
Pavla Vodová
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1. Bank Liquidity and its Measuring
Bank for International Settlements [7] defines
liquidity as the ability of bank to fund increases
in assets and meet obligations as they come
due, without incurring unacceptable losses.
Liquidity risk, e.g. the risk that a bank would not
have enough liquidity, arises from the funda-
mental role of banks in the maturity transfor-
mation of short-term deposits into long-term
loans. According to [22], the term liquidity risk
includes three types of risk: central bank
liquidity risk, funding liquidity risk and market
liquidity risk. Central bank liquidity risk is highly
unlikely as it is a risk that the central bank
would not be able to supply the liquidity needed
to the financial system (in fact, a central bank
can only be illiquid to the extent that there is no
demand for domestic currency, e.g. in case of
hyperinflation or an exchange rate crisis).
Funding liquidity risk captures the inability of
a bank to service their liabilities as they come
due. Market liquidity risk relates to the inability
of trading at a fair price with immediacy. The
dimension of market liquidity risk includes
market depth (the ability to execute large
transactions without influencing prices unduly);
tightness (the gap between bid and offer
prices); intermediacy (the speed with which
transaction can be executed); and resilience
(the speed with which underlying prices are
restored after disturbance) [11].
Central bank liquidity risk, funding liquidity
risk and market liquidity risk are intensively
interconnected. In normal times, these linkages
promote a virtuous circle in financial system
liquidity, guaranteeing the smooth functioning
of the financial system. In turbulent times, the
linkages can be distorted and there is
a possibility of reverting from a virtuous to
a vicious circle in the economy [22].
The first symptom of a liquidity crisis in the
banking sector generally takes the form of
a liquidity deficit in the balance sheet of a bank
[39]. Bank for International Settlements [7]
recommends banks to identify alternative
sources of funding that strengthen its capacity
to withstand a variety of severe yet plausible
institution-specific and market-wide liquidity
shocks. Depending on the nature, severity and
duration of the liquidity shock, potential sources
of funding include the following:
 deposit growth;
 the lengthening of maturities of liabilities;
 new issues of short- and long-term debt
instruments;
 intra-group fund transfers, new capital
issues, the sale of subsidiaries or lines of
business;
 asset securitization;
 the sale of highly liquid assets;
 drawing-down committed facilities;
 and borrowing from the central
bank’s marginal lending facilities.
However, not all of these options may be
available in all circumstances and some may
be available only with a substantial time delay.
Bank management should regularly review and
test its fund-raising options to evaluate their
effectiveness at providing liquidity. [2] divide
these possibilities into three main mechanisms
that banks can use to insure against liquidity
crises:
 Banks hold buffer of liquid assets on the
asset side of the balance sheet. A large
enough buffer of assets such as cash,
balances with central banks and other banks,
debt securities issued by governments and
similar securities or reverse repo trades
reduce the probability that liquidity
demands threaten the viability of the bank.
 The second strategy is connected with the
liability side of the balance sheet. Banks
can rely on the interbank market where they
borrow from other banks in case of liquidity
demand. However, this strategy is strongly
linked with market liquidity risk.
 The last strategy concerns the liability side
of the balance sheet, as well. The central
bank typically acts as a Lender of Last
Resort to provide emergency liquidity
assistance to particular illiquid institutions
and to provide aggregate liquidity in case of
a system-wide shortage.
Liquidity risk can be measured by two main
methods: liquidity gap and liquidity ratios.
Liquidity gap is the difference between assets
and liabilities at both present and future dates.
At any date, a positive gap between assets and
liabilities is equivalent to a deficit [6]. Liquidity
ratios are various balance sheet ratios which
should identify main liquidity trends. These
ratios reflect the fact that the bank should be
sure that appropriate, low-cost funding is
available in a short time. This might involve
holding a portfolio of assets than can be easily
sold (cash reserves, minimum required
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reserves or government securities), holding
significant volumes of stable liabilities
(especially deposits from retail depositors) or
maintaining credit lines with other financial
institutions. Various authors like [24], [31] or
[33] provide various liquidity ratios:
 Most common measure of liquidity risk is
a liquid asset ratio which is the share of
liquid assets on total assets. This ratio
should give us information about the
general liquidity shock absorption capacity
of a bank. As a general rule, the higher the
ratio, the higher the capacity to absorb
liquidity shock is, given that market liquidity
is the same for all banks in the sample.
Nevertheless, a high value of this ratio may
be also interpreted as inefficiency. Since
liquid assets yield a lower income liquidity
bears high opportunity costs for the bank.
Therefore it is necessary to optimize the
relation between liquidity and profitability.
The liquid asset ratio has also its short-
coming: it ignores the flow of funds from
repayments, increases in liabilities and the
demand for bank funds [24].
 The share of liquid assets on deposits and
short term borrowing – this ratio is more
focused on the bank’s sensitivity to selected
types of funding (deposits of households,
enterprises, banks and other financial
institutions and funds from debt securities
issued by the bank); it should therefore
capture the bank’s vulnerability related to
these funding sources. The higher is the
value of the ratio, the higher is the capacity
to absorb liquidity shock.
 The share of liquid assets on deposits – this
ratio is very similar to the previous one;
however, it includes only deposits to
households and enterprises. It measures the
liquidity of a bank assuming that the bank
cannot borrow from other banks in case of
liquidity need. This is relatively strict measure
of liquidity but it enables us to capture at least
the part of the market liquidity risk. The bank
is able to meet its obligations in terms of
funding (the volume of liquid assets is high
enough to cover volatile funding) if the value
of this ratio is 100 % or more. A lower value
indicates a bank’s increased sensitivity
related to deposit withdrawals.
 The share of loans on total assets – it
indicates what percentage of the assets of
the bank is tied up in illiquid loans; therefore
the higher this ratio the less liquid the bank is.
 The share of loans on deposits – it relates
illiquid assets to liquid liabilities. Its
interpretation is again: the higher this ratio
the less liquid the bank is. Lower values of
this ratio means that loans provide by the
bank are financed by clients’ deposits.
 The interbank ratio is computed as a ratio of
due from banks over due to banks. This
ratio measures the position of a bank in the
interbank market. If this ratio is greater than
100 %, then it indicates that the bank is net
lender (and thus probably more liquid).
These liquidity ratios are still in common. It
is possible to calculate them only on the basis
of publicly available data from banks’ balance
sheets and it is easy to interpret their values.
Their disadvantage is the fact that they do not
always capture all, or any of liquidity risk.
2. Trends in the Liquid Asset Ratio
in the Visegrad Countries
First, we will focus on the development of liquid
asset ratio of banks in the Visegrad countries.
We have used unconsolidated balance sheet
data over the period from 2000 to 2011. As it
can be seen from Tab. 1, the sample includes
significant parts of all banking sectors (not only
by a number of banks but mainly by their share
on total banking assets).
Nevertheless, the share of the observed
bank on total assets (mainly for Slovakia) and the
number of observed banks (mainly for Hungary
and Poland) may appear to be quite low. Partly it
is a consequence of a growing role of branches
of foreign banks; partly it is because we do not
include data from building societies, mortgage
banks and from specialized banks like
âeskomoravská záruãní a rozvojová banka,
Slovenská záruãná a rozvojová banka, âeská
exportní banka, Exim banka, Magyar Fejlesztési
Bank or Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego which
focus on very special financial products and
services. The panel is unbalanced as some of
banks do not report over the whole period of time.
For these banks, we have calculated the liquid
asset ratio. We include cash, government bonds,
short-term claims on other banks and securities
from trading portfolio in liquid assets. As higher
value of this ratio means higher liquidity, it is evident
that bank liquidity in all Visegrad countries has
decreased during the analyzed period (Fig.1). 
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However, the development trends differ
among individual countries. Liquidity of Czech
banks declined in 2000–2009, due to the mutual
effect of a higher lending activity of Czech
banks and of the decrease of balances with
central banks and other banks [13]. However,
we can see a slightly improvement of liquidity in
last two years so the average liquidity position
Tab. 1: Data Availability
Indicator 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
Czech Republic
Total number of banks 40 38 37 35 35 36 37 37 37 39 41 44
Number of observed banks 14 15 16 16 16 15 13 13 12 12 13 12
Share of observed banks 
on total assets (in %)
75 77 76 76 74 71 74 74 68 70 70 77
Hungary
Total number of banks 40 41 39 38 35 34 37 38 36 35 35 35
Number of observed banks 13 18 23 24 26 29 28 27 26 23 21 13
Share of observed banks 
on total assets (in %)
72 74 84 86 87 88 88 87 88 88 87 83
Poland
Total number of banks 73 71 62 60 54 54 51 50 52 49 49 44
Number of observed banks 15 23 26 31 34 34 31 30 31 30 27 19
Share of observed banks 
on total assets (in %)
60 70 73 88 84 84 82 80 79 79 78 74
Slovakia
Total number of banks 23 21 20 21 21 23 24 26 26 26 29 31
Number of observed banks 11 13 13 13 13 14 12 12 12 11 10 10
Share of observed banks 
on total assets (in %)
46 58 54 59 59 65 62 65 69 67 65 66
Source: author’s processing
Fig. 1: Liquid Asset Ratio in the Visegrad Countries
Source: author’s calculation
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of Czech banks is better. This is caused mainly
by a higher portion of government securities
held by banks [15].
The fall in liquidity of Hungarian, Polish and
Slovak banks is mainly a result of the financial
crisis (this impact is statistically significant for
Poland – see Section 4). The financial crisis
and bank liquidity can influence each other in
both directions: the financial crisis can be
caused by poor bank liquidity; or poor bank
liquidity can be a result of the financial crisis.
The financial crisis affects banks in two
different ways. First, the volatility of important
macroeconomic variables influences unfa-
vorably the business environment of banks.
Second, the instability deteriorates the
business environment of borrowers; it can
worsen their ability to repay the loans which
can lead to a decline in bank liquidity.
It is interesting that the financial crisis has
affected each banking sector in different year.
The liquid asset ratio of Slovak banks
fluctuated only slightly during the period
2000–2008; about one-third of assets of Slovak
banks were liquid assets. This ratio sharply
dropped in 2009. According to the National
Bank of Slovakia [26], the year 2009 can be
considered with certainty to be a turning point
for the banking sector. The economic crisis
adversely effected sectors in which Slovak
banks have significant credit exposures. Also
activities in the interbank market strongly
changed: in previous years, Slovak banks mostly
received deposits from foreign banks and then
conducted sterilization operations with the
National Bank of Slovakia. In 2009, after the
euro changeover, these operations lost their
previous significance. Most banks borrowed
funds from other banks with the Eurosystem
and invested these funds predominantly in
government bonds and in some cases in the
interbank market, mainly in transactions with
parent banks. The fall of liquidity in 2009 was
followed by an even deeper decline in 2010.
The amount of liquid assets was adversely
affected by the ending of growth trends in
government bond investments in 2010.
Moreover, there was an increase in the share of
foreign bonds, including speculative-grade
bonds in certain banks. Some banks also faced
the bigger maturity mismatch between assets
and liabilities due to a higher share of very
short-term deposits which made them more
dependent on the stability of these funds [27].
We can see also slightly improvements in 2011.
When it comes to Polish banks, the liquid
asset ratio fluctuated only slightly during the
period 2000–2006. In 2007, the liquidity started
to decline. Banks financed increased demand
for loans both to households and non-financial
companies also by reduction of the part of liquid
assets. Mainly small and medium sized banks
with a poorly developed deposit base used
funds from the interbank market [29]. In 2008,
the increase in lending activities continued.
However, some important structural weaknesses
occurred: due to banks exceeded due from
banks and the Polish banking sector as a whole
became net borrower in the interbank market;
household debts in foreign currency grew
rapidly (up to more than 25 % of total loan
portfolio [30]; and a very high loan-to-deposit
ratio which signals that while financing loans,
many banks have not enough clients deposits
and are dependent on other sources of
financing such as loans from other banks or
funds from debt securities issuance.
The situation was very similar in the
Hungarian banking sector which was affected
by the financial crisis already in 2007.
According to [20], the internal, structural
features of the banking sector have evolved
over the years. These specifics are, as in case
of the Polish banking sector, a very high loan-
to-deposit ratio, long net foreign currency
position which resulted from the growing ratio
of foreign currency loans (about one third of
loans to non-financial companies and even two
thirds of loans to households). Moreover, some
Hungarian banks provided loans to foreign
customers especially from CEE countries
which were financed partly by local retail
deposits. These structural weaknesses gained
special importance due to the worsening
financial and economic conditions.
3. The Model
In order to identify determinants which affect
liquid assets of commercial banks in the
Visegrad countries we use the panel data
regression analysis (Equation 1).
LARit = α + β′ . Xit + δi + εit (1)
where LARit is liquid asset ratio for bank i in
time t, Xit is vector of explanatory variables for
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bank i in time t, α is constant, β' is coefficient
which represents the slope of variables,
δi represents fixed effects in bank i, and
εi means the error term.
It is evident that the most important task is
to choose the appropriate explanatory variables.
Although liquidity problems of some banks
during the global financial crisis re-emphasized
the fact that liquidity is very important for the
functioning of financial markets and the
banking sector, an important gap still exists in
the empirical literature about liquidity and its
measuring. Most studies focus on bid-ask
spreads in the market and thus on the measu-
rement and determinants of market liquidity.
However, only few studies aim to identify
determinants of funding liquidity measured by
any liquidity ratio which reflects in part the lack
of interest, until recently at least, of some
regulators [3].
Aspachs et al. [2] study bank-specific and
macroeconomic determinants of liquidity of 57
UK-resident banks, on data on a quarterly basis
over the period from 1985Q1 to 2003Q4. They
found out that the liquidity ratio is a function of
the probability of obtaining the support from
a lender of last resort in case of a liquidity
shortage (which lowers the incentive to hold
liquid assets); short term interest rate which
captures the monetary policy effect (the
negative regression coefficient signals that
when policy rates are high banks respond by
holding a smaller amount of liquid assets);
growth rate of gross domestic product (banks
hold a smaller amount of liquidity in periods of
a stronger economic growth); and interest margin
as a measure of opportunity costs of holding
liquid assets which has a negative impact on
liquidity holdings. For foreign owned banks,
support from a lender of last resort does not
appear to affect their holding of liquid assets.
When it comes to short term interest rate and
growth rate of gross domestic product, these
variables are statistically significant, too, but
their effect on bank liquidity is smaller. The
interest margin affects liquidity of foreign
owned banks positively. Bank profitability; loan
growth where a higher loan growth should
signal an increase in illiquid assets and size of
the bank are not statistically significant.
Determinants of liquidity risk of 1107 banks
from 36 emerging economies in the period
1995–2000 were analyzed by [9]. Their main
aim was to explore how the liquidity of
commercial banks is affected by the exchange
rate regime of the country in which they
operate. They found out that in extreme regimes
at both ends of the line (i.e. pure floating at one
end and currency board and dollarized
economies at the other end) banks are more
liquid than in intermediate regimes. However,
they focus also on other determinants both on
the macroeconomic and bank-specific level.
According to their results, bank liquidity
depends on the individual behavior of banks,
their market and macroeconomic environment.
Following factors have a positive impact on
bank liquidity: capital adequacy (higher capital
adequacy is concomitant with higher liquidity);
lending interest rate which is consistent with the
credit rationing phenomenon; and the share of
public expenditures on gross domestic product
which measures the supply of relatively liquid
assets. On the contrary, the impact of the
financial crisis (which is very often caused by
poor bank liquidity) is negative. The link between
the presence of a prudential regulation (which
should be the obligation for banks to be liquid
enough and an incentive mechanism for banks
to enforce a more efficient liquidity mana-
gement) is mixed and depends on the used
dependent variable (they used different liquidity
ratios). The results show that the introduction of
the prudential regulation increases confidence
in the banking sector so that banks can collect
more deposits, thus increasing liquid liabilities,
while, at the same time but to a lesser extent,
investing more in illiquid projects. The impact
size of bank measured by its total assets; the
growth rate of gross domestic product; and the
rate of inflation are not statistically significant.
The impact of various variables on the
share of liquid assets in deposits was investi-
gated by [1]. They use data of the Thailand
banking sector in the period of January 1992 to
October 1998. They have found that bank
liquidity in Thailand increased as a result of
a higher discount rate (which they see as
a penalty rate of insufficient liquidity) and
a higher volatility of the cash to deposit ratio (as
a proxy for liquidity risk volatility). However, it
appeared that banks hold a higher buffer of
liquid assets mainly after the collapse of the
baht, i.e. in periods of higher perceived degree
of uncertainty or risk of default in the aftermath.
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The empirical analysis of the hypothesis
that interest rates affect banks’ risk taking and
the decision to hold liquidity across European
countries provides [21]. The analysis is based
on data of 5066 European banks over the
period from 1998 to 2004. The study came to
conclusion that across European countries, the
interbank interest rate positively affects the
liquidity retained by banks and the decision of
a bank to be a lender in the interbank market.
The key variable which affects the decision to
lend in the interbank market is the liquidity price
which depends on the demand and supply of
liquidity and on the risk-free interest rate. The
increase of this price increases the liquidity
supply and thereby the lending in the interbank
market. As this new liquidity is invested by
borrowers in risky loans, the rise in the risk-free
interest rate increases banks’ risk-taking
behaviour (which is measured by the share of
loans on total assets and share of loan loss
provisions on net interest revenues). The
results also showed that bank size matters: the
lender banks tend to be smaller than borrower
ones. The relation between the monetary policy
interest rate and the decision of a bank to hold
liquidity and to lend in the interbank market is
negative.
The effects of the financial crisis on the
liquidity of commercial banks in Latin America
and Caribbean countries investigated [24]. The
results based on monthly observations over the
period from January 1970 to December 2004
show that liquidity tends to be inversely related
to the business cycle in half of the countries
studied; and to the volatility of the cash-to-
deposit ratio as well (which indicates that
commercial banks tend to expand liquidity when
the volatility of cash demand by the public rises).
The effect of the money market interest rate as
a measure of opportunity costs of holding
liquidity is mixed: the coefficient is positive in
some countries and negative in some other
countries (mainly in countries with relatively
high interest rates). The relation between the
financial crisis and bank liquidity is also mixed:
in six out of the nine countries, banks were less
liquid during the crisis. This concerns in
particular countries where there was a lending
boom before the crisis or where banks were
subject to large deposit withdrawals during the
crisis. In other three countries, banks were
more liquid during the crisis. In most of these
countries the banking crisis was accompanied
by an exchange rate crisis that probably led
banks to be more conservative in their liquidity
policies. However, such bank behavior can
deepen the crisis if companies cannot access
credits to finance their operations.
Liquidity created by all 457 German state-
owned savings banks and its determinants in
the period from 1997 to 2006 was analyzed by
[32]. According to this study, bank liquidity is
determined by macroeconomic factors; mainly
by the monetary policy interest rate which has
a highly significant negative influence on bank
liquidity (i.e. tightening monetary policy reduces
bank liquidity). The level of unemployment is
connected with demand for loans and can also
act as a proxy for the general health of the
economy and the negative influence means.
The negative influence of the level of
unemployment indicate that the healthier the
economy is, i.e. the lower the unemployment
rate, the more liquidity is created by banks.
They do not find any bank specific factors, such
as bank profitability or size of the bank
measured by a total number of bank customers,
to have any influence on liquidity creation. Also
the savings quota which should indicate the
deposit behavior of private clients is not
statistically significant.
Entirely unique is the approach of [18].
Except of common determinants, they investigate
the impact of violent political incidents arising
from conflict between radical Islamic group and
the Egyptian state. Based on data for the period
1983–1996, they found out that bank liquidity is
pro-cyclical (the level of the economic output is
taken into account by the logarithm of real
gross domestic product) and responds positively
also to increases in the discount rate (although
this response seems only to be temporary), to
the degree of the macroeconomic instability
which is captured by the rate of depreciation of
the black market exchange rate. The impact of
economic reforms reduced excess liquidity.
However, the most important factor which has
an impact on bank liquidity is the number of
violent political incidents: banks hold excessive
liquid reserves in periods of the political
instability.
Berger et al. [4] used data of almost all U.S.
banks over the period 1993–2003 and explored
how banks create liquidity. They tested whether
the liquid asset ratio is determined by bank
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capital (measured by the share of equity in total
assets); bank risk (measured by the standard
deviation of banks’ return on assets, by the
share of risk-weighted assets and off-balance
sheet activities in total assets, and by the 
Z-score which shows the distance to default);
bank size (measured by the logarithm of total
assets); bank holding company status (a dummy
variable if the bank is a part of a holding);
merger and acquisition history (a dummy
variable for banks which was involved in
a merger or acquisition over past three years);
local market competition (measured by the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index and share of bank
market held by medium and large banks); and
economic environment (measured by the
logarithm of the weighted average population in
all markets in which a bank has deposits, by the
weighted average population density and by
the weighted average income growth). They
estimate the regression separately for small,
medium and large banks. Their results showed
that the most important determinant of the bank
liquidity creation is capital adequacy. However,
its impact differs by the size of the bank: the
relationship between capital and liquidity
creation is positive for large banks, insignificant
for medium banks and negative for small
banks. The different links between bank capital
and liquidity for small and large U.S. banks can be
explained by two different theories. The financial
fragility-crowding out hypothesis suggests that
bank capital may impede liquidity creation by
making the bank’s capital structure less fragile.
A fragile capital structure encourages the bank to
commit to monitoring its borrowers, and hence
allows it to extend loans. Additional equity capital
makes it harder for the less fragile bank to commit
to monitoring, which in turn hampers the
bank’s ability to create liquidity. Capital may also
reduce liquidity creation because it crowds out
deposits. An alternative view – the risk absorption
hypothesis – is related to banks’ role as risk
transformers and emphasizes that higher capital
improves banks’ ability to absorb risk and hence
their ability to create liquidity. The review of
studies which supports both hypotheses can be
found in [4]. However, they found also some other
important determinants of bank liquidity: banks
that are members of a holding company, have
a retail orientation, and engaged in mergers and
acquisitions activity during the prior three years
create more liquidity.
Cornet et al. [10] study how banks managed
the liquidity shock that occurred during the
financial crisis of 2007–2009 by adjusting their
holdings of cash and other liquid assets and
how these efforts affected credit availability.
Their sample included quarterly data of all US
commercial banks over the period 2006Q1
through 2009Q2. They estimated regression
function separately for small and large banks
with following explanatory variables: the share
of illiquid assets (such as loans, leases, asset-
backed securities, mortgage-backed securities)
on total assets; the share of core deposits 
(i.e. deposits under USD 100 000 plus all
transactions deposits) on total assets; bank
capital adequacy and the ratio of unused
commitments to commitments plus assets.
They came to conclusion that during the crisis,
the liquidity risk exposure led to greater
increases in liquid assets, mirrored by greater
decreases in credit origination. In other words,
banks with more illiquid asset portfolios
increased their holdings of liquid assets and
decreased lending. The results showed
significant differences between small and large
banks. Mainly small banks that relied more
heavily on stable sources of financing, i.e. core
deposits and capital, continued to lend relative
to other banks. Moreover, large banks have
higher share of illiquid assets on total assets
than small banks and also hold a greater
fraction of unused commitments. Large banks
are more exposed to liquidity risk than small
banks across four dimensions: more undrawn
commitments, less capital, less reliance on
core deposits and lower liquidity of balance
sheet assets. Off-balance sheet liquidity risk
materialized as borrowers drew on pre-existing
commitments in large quantities.
Berrospide [5] analyzed a panel dataset
using the quarterly balance sheet data for all
U.S. commercial banks between 2005 and 2009
with a regression framework which considers
the share of liquid assets in total assets as the
dependent variable. Potential explanatory
variables included the logarithm of total assets
(as a proxy for bank size); the Tier 1 capital
ratio; the share of core deposits in total assets
(as a proxy for the role of stable sources of
funding); the unused commitment ratio (as
a proxy for off-balance sheet funding liquidity
stemming from loans); security write-downs (as
a measure of banks’ exposure to expected
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losses in their securities portfolio); and the
share of loan loss reserves in total loans (as
a measure of the possibility that a further
deterioration in credit quality forces banks to
reallocate their assets from risky loans to safe
and liquid securities). They found out that
banks increased their holdings of liquid assets
during the financial crisis also in anticipation of
future losses from securities write-downs and
expected loan losses. On the contrary, holdings
of liquid assets decrease with bank capital and
core deposits (which substitute for cash and
other liquid assets) and also with size of the bank.
The analysis of liquidity position of foreign
owned banks in ten Central and Eastern
European economies (Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) in
the period 1994–2004 is provided by [16]. They
used the share of liquid assets in deposits and
short term funding as the dependent variable
and many explanatory variables, such as bank
size (measured by logarithm of total assets);
capitalization (measured by the share of equity
in total assets); average real deposit rate in the
banking system (as a proxy for the cost of
holding liquid reserves); real interbank rate (as
a measure for the cost of liquidity in the banking
system); growth rate of gross domestic product
(as a proxy for the stage of the business cycle);
level of GDP per capita (as a proxy for a general
economic development); and a dummy variable
which should indicate banks’ transnational
status. They found out that transnational banks
hold a higher relative volume of liquid assets
only in the case of aggregate liquidity
shortages. In normal times, liquidity of banks
operating in a single country is higher. This is
caused by the fact that transnational banks
have access to foreign sources of liquidity.
Larger banks hold less liquid assets than
smaller ones. Bank liquidity is increasing with
better capitalization, a higher interbank rate,
a lower deposit rate, a lower growth rate of
GDP and a lower GDP per capita.
The liquidity buffers of 112 Australian
depository institutions in the period from June
2002 to March 2012 are analyzed by [19]. The
results showed that depository institutions build
up their liquidity buffer during economic
downturns and draw them down in economic
upturns (measured by the growth rate of GDP).
Liquidity is decreasing with the size of the
depository institution (measured by the
logarithm of total assets), with a higher lending
growth, higher profitability and also during
periods of a high interbank interest rate. They
also found out that the net interest margin is
inversely related to the liquidity buffer which
means that banks hold less liquidity when
opportunities to earn higher returns on loans
are available. However, this impact is not
statistically significant.
Hunteanu [25] analyzed the impact of capital
adequacy, asset quality (measured by the
share of impaired loans in total loans and by
the share of loan loss provisions in net interest
revenues), interbank funding (measured as
a share of interbank assets in interbank
liabilities), funding costs (measured as a share
of the total interest expenses in total liabilities),
costs to income ratio, interbank interest rate,
credit risk rate (measured as a share of total
exposures in total loans and interests), inflation
rate, growth rate of the real GDP and
unemployment rate on liquidity of 27 banks
active in Romania over the period 2002–2010.
The results showed that different factors
influence the share of liquid assets in deposits
and short term funding in different periods. In
the whole analyzed period, bank liquidity is
positively linked with loan loss provisions,
funding costs and the unemployment rate and
negatively linked with the interbank interest
rate. Focusing only on the pre-crisis period
(2002–2007), bank liquidity increases with
higher capital adequacy and decreases with
the higher credit risk and inflation rate. In the
crisis period (2008–2010), bank liquidity is
positively related to loan loss provisions, the
interbank interest rate and inflation rate.
The selection of variables was based on the
above cited relevant studies. We considered
whether the use of the particular variable makes
economic sense in the Visegrad countries. For
this reason, we excluded from the analysis
variables such as political incidents. We also
considered which other factors could influence
the behavior of banks in the interbank market.
The limiting factor then was the availability of
some data. The list of used variables can be
found in Tab. 2.
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We considered four bank specific factors
and nine macroeconomic factors. We do not
have an exact expectation of the impact of these
factors on the liquid asset ratio because their
impact was different in the above cited studies.
The macroeconomic data were provided by the
International Financial Statistics of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The data on
average exchange rates were provided by
Oanda Corporation. The bank specific data were
obtained from the unconsolidated balance sheet
and profit and loss data of banks’ annual reports.
4. Results and Discussion
We used an econometric package EViews 7. After
tests of stationarity, normality and multicolli-
nearity, we proceed with regression estimation.
We estimated Equation 1 both for all Visegrad
countries and as well separately for each
country. First we included all explanatory
variables which might have an effect on the
dependent variable. To reduce the number of
explanatory variables, we used information
criteria (Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn).
The aim was to find a regression model with
a high value of the adjusted coefficient of
determination in which all the variables
involved are statistically significant.
Although most studies assumed the
negative link between the business cycle and
bank liquidity, the results show that the
approach of [18] can be applied on banking
sectors in the Visegrad countries (Tab. 3).
A positive sign of the coefficient signals that the
cyclical downturn should lower banks' expected
transactions demand for money and therefore
lead to decreased liquidity. Moreover, during
expansionary phases, companies (which have
higher profits) and households (which have
a higher income) might prefer to rely more on
internal sources of finance and reduce the relative
proportion of external financing and might
reduce their debt levels. In recessions, house-
holds and corporations may increase their
demand for bank credit in order to smooth out
the impact of a lower income and profits. The
growth rate of gross domestic product is
statistically significant with one year lag which
is consistent with the fact that companies and
households need some time for accumulating
profits and savings and therefore it takes some
time for changes to be reflected in banks’
liquidity. Lagged values are also more likely
reflect earlier decisions [4].
Tab. 2: Variables Definition
Variable Source
CAP: the share of equity on total assets of the bank annual reports
NPL: the share of non-performing loans on total volume of loans annual reports
ROE: the share of net profit on banks’ equity annual reports
TOA: logarithm of total assets of the bank annual reports
FIC: dummy variable for financial crisis (1 in 2009, 0 in rest of the period for 
CR and SK, 1 in 2008 and 2009, 0 in rest of the period for PL and HU) own
GDP: growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP volume % change) IMF
INF: inflation rate (CPI % change) IMF
IRB: interest rate on interbank transactions IMF
IRL: interest rate on loans IMF
IRM: difference between interest rate on loans and interest rate on deposits IMF
MIR: monetary policy interest rate IMF
UNE: unemployment rate IMF
EUR: exchange rate CZK(HUF, PLN, SKK)/EUR (yearly average) Oanda Corp.
Source: author’s processing
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Bank liquidity is positively affected by the
interest rate on loans and negatively affected
by the interbank interest rate. Although these
two effects may appear to be quite surprising,
they are consistent with the problem of credit
crunch and credit rationing (whose presence in
the Czech banking sector was proved by [37].
According to [38], an increase in the interest
rate is connected with two effects. The
incentive effect increases interest incomes and
thus the bank’s profit. On the contrary, the risk
of the bank’s credit portfolio can increase due to
an adverse selection effect and thus the profit
decreases. So the increase in the interest rate
on loans does not have to encourage banks to
lend more. As a result, instead of the lending
activity, banks focus more on liquid assets
(either interbank transactions or trading with
securities). The negative impact of the interbank
interest rate may have a very similar
explanation. Banks may perceive an increase in
the interbank interest rate as a signal of a higher
risk of interbank lending. Their motivation to
lend to other banks (which would increase the
liquid assets) is therefore lower. These findings
are also in accordance with conclusions of [19]
and [24] for the interbank interest rate and of [9]
for the interest rate on loans.
We expected a negative influence of non-
performing loans but results of the analysis
show the opposite effect. This could be a sign
of a prudent policy of banks: they offset
a higher credit risk in the previous year with
cautious liquidity risk management.
The positive influence of bank profitability is
statistically significant with two years lag which
is in accordance with [2] who noted that liquidity
constrained banks need to accumulate the
profit which then may be invest in liquid assets
and thus used as a source of liquidity.
According to our findings, small banks are
more liquid than big banks in the Visegrad
countries. This finding fully corresponds to the
well-known “too big to fail” hypothesis. If big
banks see themselves as “too big to fail”, their
motivation to hold liquid assets is limited. In case
of a liquidity shortage, they rely on liquidity
assistance of a Lender of Last Resort. This is also
in accordance with results of [16], [19] and [21].
Capital adequacy, financial crisis, inflation,
interest margin, monetary policy interest rate
and unemployment rate have no statistically
significant impact on liquid assets in the
Visegrad countries.
The estimated coefficients that fit best the
regression model for the Czech banks are
presented in Tab. 4. The explanatory power of
the model is quite high. The positive influence
of the share of capital on total assets is
consistent with the assumption that a bank with
sufficient capital adequacy should be liquid,
too, and with findings of [4], [9], [16] and [25].
The positive coefficient of the exchange
rate CZK/EUR signals that the depreciation of
Tab. 3: Determinants of Liquid Assets in the Visegrad Countries











Note: The starred coefficient estimates are significant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) or 10% (***) level.
Source: author’s estimation
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the Czech koruna leads to a higher liquid asset
ratio. Interbank transactions are a substantial
part of liquid assets. The Czech banking sector
is a net lender in the interbank market [14]; it is
therefore highly probable that at least some
Czech banks lend also to a foreign bank. The
profitability of such transactions increases with
the domestic currency depreciation. Therefore,
the depreciation of the Czech koruna can
stimulate banks to focus more on the international
interbank transaction and thus increase their
level of liquid assets.
The influence of bank profitability on the
value of the liquid asset ratio is opposite than it
was for the entire group of the Visegrad
countries. However, the negative influence of
bank profitability measured by return on equity
is consistent with the standard finance theory
which emphasizes the negative correlation of
liquidity and profitability and with results of [19].
The liquid asset ratio is determined by the
capital adequacy, growth rate of GDP and size of the
bank in Hungary. The explanatory power of the
model for the Hungarian bank is very high (Tab. 5).
Tab. 4: Determinants of Liquid Assets in the Czech Republic








Note: The starred coefficient estimates are significant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) or 10% (***) level.
Source: author’s estimation
Tab. 5: Determinants of Liquid Assets in Hungary








Note: The starred coefficient estimates are significant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) or 10% (***) level.
Source: author’s estimation
As in case of the whole group of the
Visegrad countries, liquidity is decreasing with
the size of a bank. On the contrary, the link
between the business cycle and bank liquidity
seems to be opposite: a negative sign of the
coefficient signals that banks hold a smaller
amount of liquidity in periods of the stronger
economic growth, as in [2] and [24]. However,
this impact is statistically significant with two
years lag which enable us to make a different
conclusion. As two years after the recession
banks hold a low level of liquid assets (and two
years after the expansion the value of the liquid
asset ratio is high a vice versa), it seems that
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liquidity tends to be rather positively related to
the business cycle (as in case of the entire V4
group and [18]).
A negative sign of the coefficient for capital
adequacy can be again a sign of a prudent
policy of banks: banks which have lower capital
adequacy in the previous year pay more
attention to liquidity risk management and hold
a higher share of liquid assets [4].
Other variables (the share of non-
performing loans, profitability, financial crisis,
inflation, all interest rates (interbank, on loans,
monetary policy), interest margin, inflation and
unemployment rate) have no statistically
significant impact on bank liquidity in Hungary.
Determinants of the liquid asset ratio in
Poland can be found in Tab. 6. Again, first we
included all explanatory variables which might
have an effect on the dependent variable and
then we reduced them with the use of information
criteria in order to find a regression model with
a high value of the adjusted coefficient of
determination in which all the variables involved
are statistically significant. Two of them – capital
adequacy and the size of the bank – have the
same impact as in case of Hungary.
Tab. 6: Determinants of Liquid Assets in Poland









Note: The starred coefficient estimates are significant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) or 10% (***) level.
Source: author’s estimation
The negative impact of the financial crisis
was discussed in Section 2 and is consistent
with findings of [9] and [24]. The positive link
between the business cycle and growth rate of
GDP is the same as in case of the entire group
of the Visegrad countries, only the lag is one
year longer. It seems that companies and
households need more time for accumulating
Tab. 7: Determinants of Liquid Assets in Slovakia









Note: The starred coefficient estimates are significant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) or 10% (***) level.
Source: author’s estimation
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the profit and savings before they will reduce
their proportion of external financing which
would result in higher bank liquidity.
The liquid asset ratio of Slovak banks is
determined by bank capital adequacy and
profitability, the interest rate on loans and the
rate of unemployment (Tab. 7). The link
between capital adequacy and bank liquidity
shows (as in case of Hungarian and Polish
banks) that banks offset lower capital adequacy
in the previous year with more cautious liquidity
risk management and hold sufficient buffer of
liquid assets [4].
Bank liquidity is positively influenced by the
interest rate on loans which is again consistent
with the problem of credit crunch and credit
rationing (as in case of the entire group of the
Visegrad countries). More liquid banks are less
profitable (as in case of Czech banks and in
[19]). The last determinant is unique for
Slovakia but is in accordance with [24]: as the
level of unemployment is connected with
demand for loans and can act as a proxy for
general health of the economy, the higher the
rate of unemployment the more liquidity is held
by banks. No other variable statistically
significantly influenced the liquid asset ratio of
Slovak banks.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to describe the
development of the liquid assets ratio and to
find out determinants which affect their values
in the Visegrad countries. Liquidity of Czech
banks declined in 2000–2009 (due to a higher
lending activity and decrease of balances with
central banks and other banks) but it has
improved during last two years. The drop in the
liquid asset ratio of Hungarian, Polish and
Slovak banks is mainly a result of the financial
crisis. In Slovakia, the crisis influenced sectors
in which banks have significant credit
exposures. It was accompanied by the change
of interbank market activities. Situation in the
Polish and Hungarian banking sector was very
similar. Some important structural weaknesses
occurred in both countries: a very high loan-to-
deposit ratio, a high share of foreign debts, and
a negative net position in the interbank market.
These weaknesses gained special importance
due to the worsening financial and economic
conditions.
Furthermore, we focused on determinants
of the liquid asset ratio. The liquid asset ratio is
positively affected by the interest rate on loans,
the growth rate of GDP in the previous year, the
share of non-performing loans, two years
lagged and by bank profitability, two years
lagged, and negatively affected by the size of
the bank and the interbank interest rate. The
liquid asset ratio of Czech banks increases with
higher capital adequacy and with the
depreciation of the Czech koruna and
decreases with higher bank profitability. In
Hungary, the liquid asset ratio is determined by
bank capital adequacy, the size of the bank and
the growth rate of GDP, two years lagged. The
impact of all these factors is negative. The
impact of capital adequacy and the size of the
bank is the same for Polish banks; moreover,
the liquid asset ratio decreases during the
period of the financial crisis and two years after
the recession in Poland. Finally, liquidity of
Slovak banks is positively influenced by the
interest rate on loans and negatively influenced
by capital adequacy in the previous year, bank
profitability and the rate of unemployment.
Although the Visegrad countries have a lot
in common, it is evident that different factors
determined the liquid asset ratio in individual
countries. The only factor that determines the
liquid asset ratio in all analyzed countries is
capital adequacy. However, the link between
capital adequacy and bank liquidity differs
among countries. In the Czech Republic, liquid
banks are solvent, too, which is consistent with
the risk absorption hypothesis. On the contrary,
insolvent banks are more liquid in all other
countries, which confirm the financial fragility-
crowding out hypothesis. This finding raises
interesting policy issues. While regulators may
be able to make banks safer by imposing
higher capital requirements, this benefit may be
associated with a reduction of liquidity of
Hungarian, Polish and Slovak banks.
The positive impact of the interest rate on
loans (in Slovakia and in the entire group of V4)
and interbank interest rate (in V4) is positive
which signals the existence of the information
asymmetry on these markets. Also the link
between the size of the bank and its liquidity is
the same for all countries where this factor was
statistically significant: Hungary, Poland and
the entire group of Visegrad countries. The
direction of influence of some factors, such as
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bank profitability or the growth rate of GDP
differs among countries. Some other factors,
such as the exchange rate, the existence of the
financial crisis or the rate of unemployment was
statistically significant only in one country.
Inflation, interest margin and monetary policy
interest rate have no statistically significant
effect on the liquid asset ratio in any of the
Visegrad countries.
This paper was prepared with the financial
support of the Czech Science Foundation
(Project GAâR P403/11/P243: Liquidity risk of
commercial banks in the Visegrad countries).
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LIQUID ASSETS IN BANKING: WHAT MATTERS IN THE VISEGRAD
COUNTRIES?
Pavla Vodová
The recent financial crisis has shown that a liquidity risk plays an important role in the current
developed financial system. Some Hungarian and Polish banks suffered liquidity problems, too.
This paper therefore aims to describe development of liquid asset ratio and to find out determinants
which affect their values in the Visegrad countries. The data cover the period from 2000 to 2011.
Liquidity of Czech banks declined in 2000–2009 (due to higher lending activity and decrease of
balances with central banks and other banks) but it has improved during last two years. Liquidity
of Slovak banks has decreased in 2009 and 2010 due to impact of financial crisis on some
economic sectors and due to changes in interbank market transactions. Very similar is the
development of liquid asset ratio in Hungary and Poland where it has gone down during last five
years due to important structural weaknesses such as very high loan-to-deposit ratio, high share
of foreign debts, and negative net position in the interbank market. Furthermore, we focus on
determinants of liquid asset ratio. Results of the panel data regression analysis showed that the
liquid asset ratio is mostly influenced by the size of the bank, its capital adequacy and profitability.
Also overall macroeconomic conditions, such as growth rate of gross domestic product, the
existence of financial crisis, exchange rate or rate of unemployment and the development of
interest rates (both on loans and interbank transaction) are important. Although the Visegrad
countries have a lot in common, different factors determined liquid asset ratio in individual countries
and also the direction of influence of some factors may differ.
Key Words: liquid assets, panel data regression analysis, commercial banks, Visegrad
countries.
JEL Classification: C23, G01, G21.
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